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Supervisor: Julie R. Irwin 
 
It is common for researchers in marketing and other social sciences interested in 
ethical behavior such as propensity to donate to a charity to ask “indirect” questions 
about others (e.g., “what would another student donate?”) in order to measure 
respondents’ own propensity to donate. The idea is that people project their own desires 
onto their responses about others and that they are more likely to admit a lower level of 
generosity when they are under the lessened social pressure of the indirect question. In 
these four studies, we measure estimates respondents make about self (self-estimates) and 
others (other-estimates) as well as their actual donations to charity, doing so at an 
individual level to challenge the prevailing wisdom that indirect responses are more 
accurate and useful for research than direct responses. I conceptualize accuracy in terms 
of both the mean and correlations. I show that although mean-level results sometimes 
show other-estimates to be closer to actual behavior, they are not consistently so, and 
explain this inconsistency; and further, that correlations show self-estimates to always 
better reflect actual donations than other-estimates. These results support the use of self-
estimates in the ethical domain and argue against the existence of projection in marketing 
research donation responses. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Managers and marketing researchers often ask respondents about their anticipated 
future ethical behavior. Donations to charity, in particular, are an especially ubiquitous 
type of ethical market activity, of interest both theoretically and practically. In 2014, 
Americans donated $358 billion or 2.1 percent of the U.S. GDP (Giving USA, 2015), 
twenty-three times the amount of U.S. game software sales that year (Entertainment 
Software Association, 2015), and nine times the U.S. smartphone market size (Statista, 
2016). Charitable donations, besides being big business, are arguably the most sizable 
and one of the purest expressions of consumer ethics and pro-social behavior in the 
marketplace, a fact which is reflected in the great interest in the topic among consumer 
researchers (e.g., Anik, Norton, & Ariely, 2014; Lee, Winterich, & Ross, 2014; Small & 
Verrochi, 2009). 
The simplest way to measure future behavior is to ask direct questions about a 
person’s intention to engage in the specific behavior, such as “How much would you 
donate?” However, indirect questions, which commonly take the form of asking how 
people think others would behave in the same situation (e.g., “How much do you think 
others would donate?”), have often been recommended as better measures of actual 
sensitive behavior (Fisher, 1993; Lusk & Norwood, 2010). The idea is that when people 
answer indirect questions they are likely to project their own propensities on the other, 
and thus be more honest than they might be when under the social pressure to inflate their 
generosity (Fisher, 1993).  
Despite the frequent use of indirect questions, the projective technique theory has 
not, to my knowledge, been verified directly. Researchers have not tested the validity of 
indirect questions by measuring actual behavior and comparing it to responses to direct 
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and indirect questions. Without data about actual behavior, I cannot be sure if actual 
behavior is really closer to responses to indirect questions than it is to responses to direct 
questions. Even more crucially, without actual behavioral data, it is impossible to 
distinguish between mean-level accuracy and discriminatory/correlational accuracy. In 
this paper, I attempt to correct for these gaps in the literature. 
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Conceptual Background  
 
PROJECTION 
Indirect questions, such as asking survey respondents about what others might do, 
think, or feel, have been used in research to identify what respondents themselves will do, 
think, or feel, especially when researchers are worried that respondents will not be honest 
due to social pressure to be more ethical or generous than they actually are. This practice 
of asking indirect questions is based on the projection theory, which claims that thoughts 
about others are actually a reflection of a respondent’s thoughts about themselves (Fisher, 
1993; Holmes, 1968).  
Fisher (1993) in particular is often cited as a source for using indirect questions to 
reduce the social desirability bias in marketing research. Many researchers have cited his 
paper and used indirect questions to measure prosocial and/or (un)ethical behavior across 
the social sciences in contexts such as purchasing ethically-produced products (Luchs, 
Naylor, Irwin, & Raghunathan, 2010; Lusk & Norwood, 2010; Olynk, Tonsor, & Wolf, 
2010), purchasing counterfeit products (Wilcox, Kim, & Sen, 2009), donating blood 
(Lacetera & Macis, 2010), downloading pirated music (Chiou, Cheng, & Huang, 2011; 
Sinha & Mandel, 2008), hiring people with disabilities (Kaye, Jans, & Jones, 2011), 
reporting unethical behavior in the workplace (D. L. Miller & Thomas, 2005), and 
reporting mistakes by retailers (i.e., receiving too much change, Steenhaut & Van 
Kenhove, 2005).  
The use of indirect questions has also extended to many practical forums. For 
example, a popular research methods website1 recommends indirect questions over direct 
                                                 
1 http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/quescont.php 
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questions for questionnaires, stating, “You might get reasonable estimates if you ask the 
respondent how much money ‘people you know’ typically give in a year to charitable 
causes.” 
In defending the use of indirect measures, researchers have pointed out that 
responses to indirect questions yielded answers in their studies that were less socially 
desirable (e.g., smaller donations, higher risky behavior) than responses to direct 
measures. They used mean-level measures of respondents’ answers to indirect and direct 
questions and inferred that the indirect responses were closer than the direct responses to 
what the respondents would actually have done. Surprisingly, this projective technique 
inference has not been tested, to my knowledge, by comparing responses to actual 
behavioral data to show whether direct or indirect measures yield more accurate measures 
of what respondents will actually do.  
Instead of measuring actual behavior, a few studies in the projective technique 
literature used proxies to determine the true value of a respondent’s traits, either a factor 
score generated based on a factor analysis or peer evaluation. Fisher and Tellis (1998) 
used factor analysis. They asked direct questions (“It’s very important TO ME that others 
approve of my purchase of each of the following five products”) and indirect questions 
(“It’s very important TO THE TYPICAL STUDENT that others approve of his or her 
purchase of each of the following five products”) for five different products. They then 
ran a factor analysis with five responses to direct questions and five responses to indirect 
questions to generate true scores. They assumed “variance that is common to both the 
direct and indirect items provides an estimate of the underlying true score,” so they used 
the factor score as an estimate of each respondent’s underlying true score. Because they 
found the factor loadings for other-estimates were greater than those for self-estimates 
and other-estimates were more highly correlated with those true scores, they concluded 
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that other-estimates are more strongly associated with true values than are self-estimates. 
Some other studies (Rokeach 1945, Sears 1936, Wells and Goldstein 1964) used peer 
ratings as a proxy for true values. For example, in studies by Sears (1936), participants 
rated themselves and others on many traits. The average ratings for a specific participant 
were considered true values for that participant’s trait. If other peers said that person A’s 
level of generosity was 6 on a 7-point scale, 6 was used as his true degree of generosity. 
This number was compared with participants’ self-estimates and the participants’ other-
estimates about generosity. However, it is an illogical application of the projective 
technique theory to use such peer evaluations as projected true values for participants 
because those peers also would have projected themselves onto the participants when 
evaluating them.  
 
“BETTER THAN AVERAGE” EFFECT 
Besides projection, another research stream related to this question is the research 
on what is commonly termed the “better than average effect” (Balcetis & Dunning, 2013; 
Balcetis, Dunning, & Miller, 2008; Epley & Dunning, 2000). These studies used indirect 
questions as a representation of what participants thought about others, used direct 
questions as a representation of what participants thought about themselves, and 
compared both to mean-level data about actual behavior. The comparison to actual 
behavior provided some basis for verifying which responses better approximated actual 
behavior, other-estimates in response to indirect questions or self-estimates in response to 
direct questions, although the so-called “holier-than-thou” researchers (e.g., Epley & 
Dunning, 2000) assumed indirect questions would reveal participants’ actual views about 
others rather than revealing the participants’ own views (as projection theorists believed 
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would be the case). Many studies in this literature took the mean response of participants’ 
other-estimates and the mean response of their self-estimates and concluded that other-
estimates were closer to actual behavior than were self-estimates, explaining that a 
participant’s reasoning about other people was more likely to consider base rates (i.e., 
expected averages) than when reasoning about themselves (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
For example, Epley and Dunning (2000) explained that predictions about how much 
others would donate ($1.83 out of $5) were closer on average to actual donation amounts 
($1.53) than were predictions about how much they would themselves donate ($2.44) 
because people were able to envision the average donation amount in the other-condition 
but used individuating information about themselves in the self-condition. These findings 
are consistent with conclusions reached by projection-based indirect question proponents, 
assuming that using mean-level data leads to sound conclusions. Thus, this set of findings 
appeared to put an end to inquiry in the literature into the superiority of indirect questions 
to predict donation behavior. 
 
RESEARCH SHOWING BETTER MEAN-LEVEL PREDICTABILITY FOR DIRECT (VERSUS 
INDIRECT) MEASURES 
There is some reason to doubt the consensus about the value of indirect 
judgments. A few studies (e.g., Goethals, 1986; D. T. Miller & Ratner, 1998; Teper, 
Inzlicht, & Page-Gould, 2011; Teper, Tullett, Page-Gould, & Inzlicht, 2015) comparing 
actual behavior to either average self- or other- estimates found self-estimates to be 
superior to other-estimates, inconsistent with the conclusion previously drawn in the 
majority of studies both inside and outside of the projective-theory domain. In the Teper 
et al. (2011, 2015) study, students were either in an action condition, in which they took a 
test and had opportunities to cheat, or they were in a prediction condition, in which they 
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predicted how much they would cheat. The findings were that those in the action 
condition actually cheated less on a math test than those in the prediction condition said 
that they would cheat. In other words, they found actual behavior to be more socially 
desirable than self-estimates in this moral context. If other-estimates were less socially 
desirable than self-estimates, actual behavior would be found to be closer to self-
estimates than other-estimates. The researchers in the Teper et al. (2011, 2015) studies 
did not ask participants to predict other students’ cheating behavior, so it is inconclusive 
whether other-estimates were less socially desirable than self-estimates. However, given 
that other research has shown that other-estimates are often less socially desirable than 
self-estimates (see Katz & Allport, 1931 for such an example in cheating behavior), it is 
reasonable to conclude from the Teper et al. (2011, 2015) work that the mean self-
estimate response would be closer to actual behavior than the mean other-estimate 
response. 
Another research stream is found in work on the “norm of self-interest.” Miller 
and Ratner (1998) found that self-estimates for prosocial behavior (in one study, 63% 
would donate blood) were more socially desirable than other-estimates (33% of others 
would) in their first four studies. Based on these results, they concluded that people 
believe others are more influenced by self-interest than they are, so they predict others’ 
behavior to be more selfish than their own. They suggested that the results would hold 
true even if they replaced self-estimates with actual behavior because they believed that 
self-estimates accurately reflected actual behavior. To prove this and address concerns 
that those higher self-estimates might simply be due to the social desirability bias, they 
conducted a fifth study, where they measured the actual behavior of all students instead 
of self-estimates. They compared the actual behavior to other-estimates how students 
assessed others and found the same pattern in the other studies. Goethals (1986) reached 
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a result similar to Miller and Ratner (1998) in one field study in which Goethals 
measured actual behavior and compared it to other-estimates in the blood donation 
context. 60% of students who were asked to donate blood actually agreed to do so, and 
they predicted that 35% of other students would donate blood. 
Because these are very different research streams, no one to my knowledge has 
noted this important and confounding contrasting pattern between studies finding that the 
average of other-estimates is closer to actual behavior and studies finding the average of 
self-estimates more closely reflect actual behavior. What would help disentangle this 
inconsistency?  
 
MEAN- VERSUS INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DATA 
Most of the findings I have outlined so far have been based on mean-level data 
and most arguments about indirect measures have focused on these averaged responses, 
especially those applying the projection theory, by far the most popular theory. Only a 
few studies (e.g., Fisher & Tellis, 1998) have relied on correlations. I suggest that the 
seemingly contradictory findings in the literature may be better understood if researchers 
concentrate on individual-level data and take into account the patterns among self-
estimates, other-estimates, and actual behavioral data across the entire range of data. I 
make the following proposition based on observation from prior research findings, which 
I will discuss shortly: 
 
Proposition: The pattern of self- versus other-estimates relative to actual donation 
behavior is unlikely to be consistent across the range of actual donation values. Thus, for 
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some datasets there may be one pattern and for others another simply because the data 
have different distributions of donation amounts.  
 
One observation from prior research findings is that researchers who found other-
estimates to be closer to actual behavior than self-estimates tended to have data sets 
where actual behavior was less socially desirable, that is, for example, actual donations 
were lower than both self- and other-estimates (e.g., Epley & Dunning, 2000), whereas 
some other researchers found actual behavior to be more socially desirable than other-
estimates (e.g., Goethals, 1986; D. T. Miller & Ratner, 1998) or than self-estimates (e.g., 
Teper et al., 2011, 2015). If actual behavior is lower (and therefore less socially 
desirable) than either self- or other-estimates, it is highly likely that actual behavior will 
be closer to other-estimates than self-estimates because prior research on the better-than-
average effect has repeatedly shown that other-estimates are generally lower (or less 
socially desirable) than self-estimates. In the same way, if actual behavior is higher (or 
more socially desirable) than self-estimates, actual behavior will be closer to self-
estimates than other-estimates. In studies where the researchers found actual behavior to 
be closer to other-estimates than to self-estimates, actual behavior tended to be lower (or 
less socially desirable) than either self- or other-estimates. For example, Epley and 
Dunning (2000) reported that “most participants used the miserly end of this scale… 
creating a positively skewed distribution.” In that study, most donors were small donors, 
so actual donations ($1.53) were smaller than both self-estimates ($2.44) and other-
estimates ($1.83). Since, consistent with the better-than-average effect, other-estimates 
were lower than self-estimates and actual was lower than both self- and other-estimates, 
actual donations were closer to other-estimates than to self-estimates.  
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What if actual behavior is more socially desirable than self-estimates? In that 
case, it will be impossible for both the better-than-average effect and Dunning and 
colleagues’ findings to be true. In order for the better-than-average effect to be true, 
actual behavior would have to be closer to self-estimates than to other-estimates, contrary 
to Dunning and colleagues’ findings. In order for Dunning and colleagues’ findings to be 
true, other-estimates would have to be more socially desirable than self-estimates, 
contrary to the better-than-average effect. However, Teper et al. (2011, 2015) actually 
found that actual behavior was more socially desirable than self-estimates. In their 
studies, the average of actual behavior in all studies was at the upper end of the spectrum. 
For example, in study 1 (Teper et al. 2015), participants predicted they would cheat on 
3.89 out of 15 questions, but they only actually cheated on an average of 1.19 questions 
out of 15 questions; the standard deviation of actual behavior was 3.02, which implies 
that most students were zero-question or one-question cheaters. Based on this discussion 
about prior research findings, I suggest that the accuracy of mean estimates depends on 
the level of actual donations. Thus, mean-level comparisons will bounce around across 
datasets depending on the distribution of responses. I will argue that self-estimates are 
more highly correlated with actual donations than other-estimates. The higher 
correlations between self-estimates and actual donations means that when self- and other-
estimates are plotted against actual donations, the result is steeper self-estimate lines than 
other-estimate lines. This hypothesis is expressed via an illustrative graph, in Figure 1. It 
becomes clear that the pattern of self- versus other-estimates relative to actual donation 
behavior is not consistent across the range of actual values when measured in terms of 
mean-level data. The self-estimate line is closer to the perfect prediction line at the high 
end, but is further away at the low end. If small donors at the low end are a large portion 
of participants (i.e., positively skewed distribution), actual donations will be lower than 
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both self- and other-estimates, so other-estimates will appear to be closer to actual 
donations on average. In contrast, if most participants donate large amounts (i.e., 
negatively skewed distribution), actual donations will be higher than both estimates, so 
now self-estimates will appear to be closer to actual donations than other-estimates. This 
pattern can explain why some researchers who had positively skewed distributions in 
their data sets (e.g., Epley & Dunning, 2000) found that other-estimates were closer to 
actual behavior than self-estimates, whereas some researchers who had negatively 
skewed distributions (e.g., Teper et al., 2015) found that actual behavior was more 
socially desirable than self-estimates. This suggests the unreliability of mean-level 
measurements in assessing self- and other-estimates.  
  
 
Figure 1:  Hypothesis – Self- and Other-Estimates versus Actual Donations 
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MEAN VERSUS CORRELATIONAL ACCURACY 
The pattern illustrated in Figure 1 is not consistent with the belief of projective 
technique theorists in that the pattern suggests that other-estimates are not always closer 
to actual behavior at the mean level, and that self-estimates are in fact more highly 
correlated with actual behavior than other-estimates. Projective technique theory would 
predict other-estimates to be both closer to and more highly correlated with actual 
behavior. Fisher argued that indirect questions were better than direct questions whether 
using mean-level measures (Fisher 1993) or correlational measures (Fisher and Tellis 
1998). To examine whether the pattern illustrated in Figure 1 is true or not, it is critical to 
identify both the mean (i.e., the intercept in a multiple regression) and also the correlation 
(i.e., the degree of fit in a multiple regression, a combination of the slope and any error). 
The degree of accuracy in any estimate can be construed as a combination of these two 
components (Dunning & Helzer, 2014; Epley & Dunning, 2000): mean-level prediction 
accuracy and correlational prediction accuracy.  
Using both mean and correlational accuracy will be useful in determining which 
theory is valid given that different theories take different views on mean and correlational 
accuracy (see Table 1). None of the different theories about indirect versus direct 
measures have traditionally conceptualized the problem in terms of both mean and 
correlational data; thus, outlining what I believe to be the expectations of each could 
prove useful in explaining why previous results seem inconsistent and how my studies 
clarify these inconsistencies and determine the superiority of direct versus indirect 
questions. Correlational accuracy will be especially helpful in distinguishing the theory of 
Dunning and colleagues (Balcetis & Dunning, 2013; Balcetis et al., 2008; Epley & 
Dunning, 2000) and the projection theory; both camps of researchers have predicted the 
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same mean-level results, but each bases its predictions on a different theory. In other 
words, mean-level results cannot distinguish the two different theories.  
The projective technique theory arises from techniques originally developed for 
psychoanalysts (e.g., Freud, 1938) and assumes that people project their own attitudes 
and behavior onto others. If it is true across the board that other-estimates are closer to a 
person’s actual behavior than that person’s own self-estimates, as the projection theory 
posits, then other-estimates should be closer to actual behavior whether applying mean-
level measures or correlational measures. Therefore, even if mean-level measures seemed 
to indicate indirect questions were better, unless correlational measures also indicated 
that to be true, one cannot conclude that projective technique theory is valid. Dunning 
and colleagues predict other-estimates to be closer to actual behavior at the mean-level, 
but less correlated with actual behavior at the individual level. Epley and Dunning (2000) 
used Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) work on comparative judgments, which suggests 
that when people make predictions about others, they have insights into the distributional 
information or the base rate of other people’s behavior, so people can accurately predict 
other people’s behavior at the mean-level, whereas when predicting their own behavior, 
they instead rely on case-specific information (e.g., specific to their personality or 
character) about themselves. Imagine, for example, an extreme situation in which half of 
the respondents donate $0 and the other half donate $7, yielding an average actual 
donation of $3.50. If all of the other-estimates were $3.50, they would look accurate even 
though no one donated $3.50. At the individual level, no one’s other-estimates would 
accurately reflect individual actual donations. The fact that everybody gave $3.50 as their 
other-estimates can be suggested as perfect evidence that people have accurate insights 
on other people’s donating behavior, and in that case, it is obvious that people did not 
project. Only correlational measures can tell us whether people project their actual 
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behavior onto others, that is, whether a person’s other-estimate reflects that person’s 
actual behavior. 
 
 
 
Predictions about Correlations 
Other is more 
correlated with Actual 
Self is more correlated 
with Actual 
Predictions 
Using the 
Mean 
Mean Other is 
closer to 
Actual 
Projection theory 
(e.g., Fisher 1993) 
“Holier than thou” research 
(e.g., Epley and Dunning 
2000) 
Mean Self is 
closer to 
Actual 
   
Norm of Self Interest 
(e.g., Miller and Ratner 
1998) 
 
Table 1:  Predictions by Different Theories  
  
GATHERING SELF-ESTIMATES, OTHER-ESTIMATES, AND ACTUAL DONATIONS 
Calculating and comparing correlations requires individual-level data for all three 
data types: self-estimates, other-estimates, and actual behavior. Note that previous 
research has not gathered all three measures at an individual level, making it impossible 
to test the crucial question of which measure is better reflective of actual behavior. 
The biggest challenge to the aim of collecting all three measures is collecting 
individual prosocial-behavioral data in an anonymous environment. The observability of 
behavior is arguably the strongest influence on prosocial/ethical behavior (Krosnick, 
1999). If participants think the experimenter can observe how they actually behave in a 
given prosocial/ethical situation, they might adjust their behavior accordingly, meaning 
the experimenter would not obtain accurate values. To this end researchers do their best 
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to make sure that participants believe the experimenter will be unable to see how they 
behave in any given prosocial/ethical situation.  
For example, in a typical experiment that provides complete anonymity for 
donation behavior, participants are given some dollar bills and they can keep all of them 
or donate as many as they want. They then put any donations in a sealed envelope and 
leave it in a collection box or return it to the proctor as they exit the experiment room 
(e.g., Epley & Dunning, 2000; Lee et al., 2014; Small & Verrochi, 2009; Smith, Faro, & 
Burson, 2013; Winterich, Mittal, & Ross Jr, 2009). Thus, this method is clever because 
researchers cannot determine how much each participant donated but rather can only 
determine the average amount donated; however, it does not reveal individual donation 
amounts, so it is impossible to calculate correlations of actual behavior to self- or other-
estimates. This methodological limitation may explain why there has been no prior 
empirical research that compared correlations of self- and other-estimates with actual 
behavior. Rather, numerous prior studies have failed to measure actual behavior, only 
reporting a positive correlation between self-estimates and other-estimates in research on 
the false consensus effect (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977) and on attributive projection 
(Holmes, 1968). The present article is the first to attempt to link self-, other-, and actual 
judgments at the individual level in the prosocial/ethical domain. 
 
SERIAL TRACKING METHOD 
I used a serial number tracking method, developed for this project, to calculate 
correlations. Unique serial numbers serve as natural identifiers to determine exactly 
which bills and therefore how much was donated of the total amount provided, as long as 
 16 
I keep track of who has which bills while assuring the personal anonymity I assured 
participants they would have.  
More specifically, before the experiment, I recorded the serial numbers of the bills 
and the seat number of each laptop, behind which each envelope was placed. I then 
entered the participant’s seat number on the first page of the survey that he or she would 
complete. Through these preliminary steps, I was able to establish links between the 
donated bills, seat numbers, and survey responses and yet the anonymity of the 
participants was completely assured, because I did not link their identity with their seat 
number. Hence, even though participants were asked to put their donation in a collection 
box placed in a separate and empty room, I was still able to determine how much each 
one donated. From the participants’ perspective, this method appeared the same as the 
completely anonymous procedures of previous studies. There were no hidden 
surveillance cameras or marks on donation envelopes that would have led participants to 
suspect lack of anonymity. Additionally, participants were allowed to donate in 0.5 dollar 
increments (e.g., $1.50); if they wanted to donate $1.50, they could put one dollar bill in a 
one-dollar exchange box and take two fifty-cent pieces from another box containing fifty-
cent pieces. Even though fifty-cent pieces do not have serial numbers, I was able to infer 
who exchanged a one-dollar bill by tracking the serial numbers of the bills in the one-
dollar exchange box. 
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Research Overview 
 
Four of my studies examined whether direct or indirect responses were better 
predictors of future donation behavior in terms of both mean-level and correlational 
prediction accuracy. In the process, the studies also answered whether projection is a 
plausible explanation for indirect responses. 
In Study 1, participants first predicted how much they and others would donate in 
a given situation and then made their actual donation decisions. Study 1 also had a 
control condition in which participants donated without making predictions to eliminate 
the mere measurement effect (Morwitz & Fitzsimons, 2004) as an explanation for the 
results. Study 2 was a test of social pressure: some participants were required to make 
public to other participants how much they would donate while others kept the 
information private. The purpose of Study 2 was to see whether direct questions would 
perform worse under the greater social pressure of public disclosure and whether greater 
social pressure would affect people differently depending on the amounts donated (i.e., 
smaller versus larger donors). Study 3 was a test of whether the type of “other” presented 
in the indirect question made a difference to (1) the mean- and (2) the correlation-level 
accuracy, to show that it can look as if accuracy has improved simply because the overall 
mean has changed even though discrimination/correlation is unaffected. In Study 4, I 
measured how people estimate others’ donations and examined whether projection really 
influences other-estimates.  
In all of the studies, mean-level accuracy depended on the level of actual 
donation. In only one of the studies was the overall mean indirect measure more accurate. 
The discriminability was always greater or equivalent for self- versus other-measures: in 
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no case were the correlations between indirect and actual measures higher than those 
between direct and actual measures. Furthermore, none of the manipulations increased 
the accuracy of indirect measures, even though projection should have had that effect. 
The studies overall show that indirect measures do not seem to be better measures than 
direct measures of donation behavior, and projection does not seem to operate to the 
extent previous researchers have assumed. 
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Study 1 
 
Study 1 measured self- and other- estimates of donations to the Red Cross, as well 
as actual donations made to the organization. The donation range was $0 to $3.00. 
 
METHOD 
Participants and design 
Eighty-two undergraduate students (62.2% female, average age 20.6 years) 
participated in Study 1 in exchange for extra course credit. Participants were randomly 
assigned to either the donation condition, in which they gave self, other, and actual 
judgments, or to the control condition in which they only gave actual judgments. 
  
Procedure 
Participants in the control condition were instructed to find an envelope 
containing three dollars behind their laptop screen, and were told that the three dollars 
was their money. Participants then received a brief description of the Red Cross: “The 
Red Cross is a humanitarian organization that provides emergency assistance, disaster 
relief and education to alleviate human suffering in the face of emergencies by mobilizing 
the power of volunteers and the generosity of donors.” They were also given the 
instruction that they could donate all or a portion of their money to the Red Cross if they 
wished. 
The instructions were designed to present a perfectly anonymous environment. 
First, participants were told that to make their donation decision, they would go one by 
one to another empty room across from the one where they started the study. Second, I 
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emphasized they could put their donation in the collection box in the donation room, 
either with or without the envelope containing their three dollars. I gave this instruction 
to avoid suspicion that donation amounts were being tracked in marked envelopes. Third, 
I instructed them to hide any leftover dollars by putting them in their pocket or in the 
envelope so that the proctor in the main room could not observe how much they were 
donating. After their donation decision, participants came back to their computers in the 
main room. To enable participants to answer and donate in fifty cent increments, they 
could exchange a one-dollar bill with two fifty-cent pieces via a separate exchange box. 
In the donation condition, at the onset of the study, I told participants that I was 
going to describe a hypothetical study and ask them how they would behave in that study. 
I then gave them the written instructions that were given to participants in the control 
condition, except that I did not indicate where the three dollars was located or where the 
donation room was located. This addition was to prevent participants from finding the 
envelope and suspecting that I would ask them to actually donate later. I told them only 
that if they were to participate in such a hypothetical study, they would receive 
instructions about receiving an envelope with three dollars in it and the remaining 
instructions about making the donation. After reading the instructions, they answered the 
two questions below, the order of which was counterbalanced: 
 
Direct question: “How much would you donate out of your $3.00? Please 
indicate the amount you would donate to the Red Cross.” 
Indirect question: “How much do you think other students in this room would 
donate on average, out of their $3.00? Please indicate the amount you think other 
students would donate on average to the Red Cross.” 
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After answering the two questions, participants in the donation condition were 
told that they would really participate in the study I had just described, and that the 
instructions were the actual instructions, not merely hypothetical. They received the full 
instructions that included information about the location of an envelope containing three 
dollars and the location of a separate empty donation room where they would put 
donation money in a collection box. They then went to the donation room and made their 
donation decisions, just as participants in the control condition had. 
Finally, in order to check the extent to which participants were suspicious that I 
could track their donation amounts, I asked how possible they thought it was that I would 
know with 100% confidence the exact amount of their donation, using a 7-point scale 
(1=absolutely possible to know, 7=absolutely impossible to know). If they answered 
“absolutely possible to know,” I asked a follow-up question asking why they thought I 
was able to know the donation amount with 100% confidence. Next, participants received 
demographic questions and a question asking the study’s purpose. 
 
RESULTS 
Suspicion checks 
Seven participants thought it was absolutely possible that I could know their 
actual donation amounts. Two students suspected the use of cameras and were excluded 
from further analysis; however, including them did not changed the results. Two students 
thought I could know their amount because their donation amounts were consistent with 
their answers. The answers from the other three students were not based on logic (e.g., 
“Science man.”). No participants mentioned serial numbers as a way to track their 
donation amount.  
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The influence of pre-estimation on actual donation  
Participants in the donation condition answered some questions about their future 
behavior before engaging in their actual behavior, and sometimes answering questions 
about behavioral intention increases the likelihood of performing the target behavior 
(Morwitz & Fitzsimons, 2004). To test for the mere measurement effect in my data, I 
compared actual donations between the donation and control conditions. The actual 
donation in the donation condition (M = 1.99) was not significantly different from that of 
the control condition (M = 1.95; F(1, 79) = .02, p > .89). I also tested whether the 
distributions of responses within the two conditions were statistically different. A 
Wilcoxon test indicated that the two conditions were similar in their distribution (Z = .05, 
p > .96). These results suggest that in my set-up, answering direct and indirect questions 
did not influence actual donations in the donation condition. The following analyses 
focus on the donation condition. 
 
Mean-level accuracy 
For mean-level analyses, I used a simultaneously fit hierarchical mixed model 
with a 2 (self versus other) within-subjects design. I tested both differences between self- 
and other-estimates and significant differences in the deviations between each of them 
and actual behavior. 
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Estimates 
There was a main effect of self versus other on estimates (F(1, 41) = 10.25, p < 
.003); consistent with prior research on the better than average effect, respondents gave 
higher donation numbers for themselves (M = $2.39) versus others (M = $1.95).  
 
Deviations from Actual  
The mean difference between self-estimates and actual donations (M = $1.99) was 
significantly different from 0 (M = $0.40, F(1, 41) = 4.83, p < .03) but the mean 
difference between other-estimates and actual donations was not significantly different 
from 0 (M = $0.04, F(1, 41) = .04, p > .85). This enhanced accuracy for indirect versus 
direct measures was significant (F(1, 41) = 10.25, p < .003). Thus, for this sample, 
average other-estimates were closer to average actual donation amounts than average 
self-estimates. 
 
 
 Means Correlations with actual behavior 
Self-estimates 2.39 .61 
Other-estimates 1.95 .31 
Actual donations 1.99  
Table 2:  Study 1 – Mean Estimates/Actual Responses and Correlations of Estimates 
with Actual Behavior 
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Correlational accuracy  
A Hotelling test for differences between correlations showed that self-estimates 
were significantly more highly positively correlated (r = .61) with actual behavior than 
were other-estimates (r = .31, t(39) = 2.38, p < .02). 
 
Slopes 
An important aspect of my methodology is that I take individual measures of self-
, other-, and actual for each participant. Thus, I can test not only for overall mean 
differences but also for whether patterns of self- /other- estimates versus actual values 
vary depending on whether the value is high or low (i.e., on the level of actual donation). 
So, is the pattern when comparing mean accuracy to actual values different at different 
levels or is it uniform across the entire range of values/donations? It is part of my 
research aim to show that in fact this type of interaction underlies results obtained by 
mean-level data and to show that there is no overall pattern whereby mean self- or other-
estimates always serve as better predictors of actual donations. To that end, I used two 
hierarchical mixed models using self/other and actual as predictors: the first used 
estimates of donations as the dependent variable; the other used deviations from actual 
donations as the dependent variable. 
When the dependent variable was estimates of donation levels, the interaction 
between self/other and actual was significant (F(1, 40) = 6.57, p < .01), indicating that 
the slope of the self-estimate line (β = .45) was significantly greater than the slope of the 
other-estimate line (β = .20).  
 
 25 
 
Figure 2:  Study 1 – Self- and Other- Estimate Lines 
When the dependent variable was the deviation from actual donation levels, the 
interaction between self/other and actual was significant (F(1, 40) = 6.57, p < .01), 
indicating that the slope of the self-estimate line is substantially more similar to the slope 
of the perfect prediction line, the slope of which is 1, than to the slope of the other-
estimate line and that the relative accuracy of self- versus other- deviations depended on 
the level of actual donation. Spotlighting a donation level of zero (0) showed that at the 
lowest level, self-deviations were not different from other-deviations (F(1, 40) = .08, p > 
.78). That is, accuracy was not different. At a donation level of 3, self-estimates were 
more accurate than other-estimates (F(1, 40) = 18.20, p < .0001). 
I conducted a floodlight analysis (Spiller, Fitzsimons, Lynch Jr, & McClelland, 
2013) to identify the Johnson–Neyman points, which in these data are the borders 
between regions of actual donations where the simple effect is significant and where it is 
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not. This analysis reveals three significant Johnson–Neyman points: actual = 1.38, 2.00, 
and 2.54. Below 1.38, there was no difference; between 1.38 and 2 the indirect measures 
were closer to actual donations than direct; and from 2.54 to 3.00 the direct measures 
were closer to actual donations than were the indirect measures. 
In other words, the relative mean-level accuracy flips across the range of data, 
with direct measures being more accurate toward the upper part of the range and indirect 
either being more accurate or equally accurate toward the lower level of the range. All of 
my studies will show this same interaction, and as outlined in the introduction, this 
interaction is consistent with the seeming lack of cohesion in previous mean-level 
findings.  
 
DISCUSSION 
This first study illustrates that correlation results and mean-level results can give 
different answers to the question, “Are other- estimates more accurate in predicting actual 
donation behavior?” For this study, other-estimates were closer on average to the mean 
actual donation amount but self-estimates were more highly correlated with actual 
donations. I could also calculate absolute deviations to measure how far away the 
reported responses were from the actual responses regardless of direction. The absolute 
deviation of self-estimates (M = .55) was significantly lower than that of other-estimates 
(M = .99; F(1, 41) = 10.25, p < .003), indicating that self-estimates were closer in 
distance to actual responses.  
These results are inconsistent with the prediction of projection-based indirect 
question proponents who would suggest that projection would result in responses to 
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indirect questions being closer to actual behavior not only using mean-level measures but 
also using correlational measures. 
Why was the mean for indirect measures closer to actual donations in this study? 
The significant interaction with actual donation levels shows that the relative accuracy of 
the mean other-estimate response depends completely on the distribution of values. Given 
the donations were on average small in this study with such a small range of possible 
donation amounts, the indirect measures were closer on average to actual donations. As I 
will show, the results for average accuracy vary across studies depending on the 
distribution of values, but correlational results do not. 
 
 
  
 28 
Study 2 
  
In Study 1, I found that direct questions performed better than indirect questions 
at predicting actual donations. However, one might wonder whether this would hold true 
when people are motivated to exaggerate more because of greater social pressure. One of 
the reasons why projective technique theorists believe that direct questions are worse than 
indirect questions at identifying an individual’s actual behavior is that they believe that 
when people answer direct questions about their intentions or behavior, they exaggerate 
their answers to look more socially desirable. Therefore, even if direct questions perform 
better in normal situations, like the one presented in Study, indirect questions might 
perform better when added social pressure could be expected to lead people to exaggerate 
to make themselves look good. Thus, in Study 2, I manipulated social pressure to 
examine whether greater exaggeration due to greater social pressure would result in 
indirect questions performing better than direct questions. 
In this study, I used a single person as a projection target (i.e., a typical college 
student), in case something in the wording of previous questions suppressed accuracy. A 
“typical” person (e.g., typical college student) or an “average” person (e.g., average 
American consumer) has been used frequently in the projective technique literature (e.g., 
Fisher, 1993; Luchs et al., 2010; Lusk & Norwood, 2010; Sinha & Mandel, 2008) and 
may make it easier for participants to project their own propensities. The indirect 
question used in Study 2 was, “If you participated in this study, how much do you think a 
typical college student would donate out of his/her $6.00?” 
In this study, I no longer included a control condition since I had confirmed in 
Study 1 that there was no mere measurement effect. I used the United Way instead of the 
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Red Cross. The brief description of the United Way included in the instructions was “The 
United Way is engaged in nearly 1,800 communities across more than 40 countries and 
territories worldwide. It focuses on improving education, strengthening financial 
stability, and making communities healthier, the building blocks for a good life and a 
strong community.”  
Since in Study 1 a few students were suspicious because they thought there was a 
camera in the separate donation room, the instructions in Studies 2 through 4 additionally 
included “There is no person or camera to observe your donation in the donation room.” I 
did not provide the fifty-cent piece exchange option because only a few participants in 
Study 1 used it. Although I eliminated this exchange option, there were still seven 
possible donation options (zero donation plus up to six dollars), just as in Study 1, but 
with a higher maximum. 
 
METHOD 
Participants and design 
One hundred and twenty-seven undergraduate students (63.8% females, average 
age 20.6 years) participated in Study 3 in exchange for extra course credit. Study 3 used a 
2 (self versus other) x 2 (exaggerate-more versus exaggerate-less) design. The question 
type factor was within-subjects, and the anonymity factor was between-subjects. 
 
Procedure  
I did two things to make participants lie more in the exaggerate-more condition: 
one was to prime participants to be more motivated to act in a more socially desirable 
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manner; the other was to have participants make public to other participants how much 
they themselves would donate.  
To prime participants, I asked them to complete a seemingly unrelated study 
before my main donation study. In the study, participants were told that the researchers 
were interested in participants’ memory capacity. They then were given a sentence to 
memorize and were told that they would be asked to type the underlined part of the 
sentence on the next page. The sentence given to participants and its underlined part were 
“People like people who they think are generous (even if it is not true)” in the exaggerate-
more condition and “The goal is for you to know yourself and be honest with yourself 
even when you are not as generous as you could be” in the exaggerate-less condition. 
After they completed this memory task, participants were guided to the next study. 
The next study is the main donation study, in which, as in the donation condition 
of Study 1, participants first answered direct and indirect questions about donations to the 
United Way and then made donation decisions with the six dollars that was given to 
them. When they answered direct questions, participants in the exaggerate-more 
condition were asked to write their donation amounts on a post-it note and put the note on 
a board attached to a pole standing in front of each participant’s seat so that other 
participants could see what was written on the post-it note. The purpose of this procedure 
was to increase the likelihood of lying by stimulating the motivation to manage 
impressions. However, the point when participants would see each other’s post-it notes 
had to be postponed until everybody completed making actual donations because if 
participants had been exposed to what other participants wrote as their donation amounts 
on post-it notes, they could have changed their estimates about their own donations, 
estimates about others’ donations, and their actual donations. Thus, I asked participants to 
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cover their written amounts with a sheet that was attached to each board until told them to 
uncover it. 
Participants in the exaggerate-less condition were also asked to write their 
donation amounts on a post-it note, but rather than putting the note on a board, they were 
asked to fold it and keep it to take with them so that nobody could see it.  
Here are the instructions used in the direct condition.  
“If you participated in this study, how much would you donate to the United Way 
out of your $6.00? 
You see a small sheet of paper with the word “cover” printed on it. If you lift the 
sheet up, you will find a yellow post-it note.  
[Take down the post-it and write down how much you would donate to the United 
Way out of your $6.00 on it. Then, put the post-it note back where it was. At the end of 
this session, you will be asked to lift the cover so that other participants can see what you 
have written on the post-it note and you can see what other participants have written. 
Until you are told to lift up the cover sheet, please make sure the post-it remains covered 
up. (for the exaggerate-more condition) / Take down the post-it and write down how 
much you would donate to the United Way out of your $6.00 and fold it. You will take the 
post-it with you so nobody can see it. (for the exaggerate-less condition)] 
Also, please indicate below the amount you wrote that you would donate to the 
United Way out of your $6.00.” 
 
The indirect question was “How much would a typical UT student donate out of 
his/her $6.00? Please indicate the amount he or she would donate to the United Way.” 
After participants answered these direct and indirect questions, as in Studies 1 and 
2, they completed unrelated filler tasks and then were told that they would really 
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participate in the study that had been suggested as a hypothetical study. They then were 
informed of the actual location of an envelope containing six dollars and the location of a 
donation room. They then went to the donation room and made their donation decisions. 
They then answered the same suspicion-check question as in Study 1. At the end of the 
sessions, participants in the exaggerate-more condition were asked to lift the “cover” 
sheet so that they could see each other’s amounts on the post-it notes. I did not randomly 
assign individual participants to either the exaggerate-more or exaggerate-less condition, 
but rather randomly assigned six sessions to one of the two conditions so that everybody 
in the same session would see all other participants behave in the same way as 
themselves. This was done to prevent participants from getting confused by observing 
other participants engaging in different behavior. For example, participants in the 
exaggerate-less condition might have been confused if they had found that some 
participants were putting their written post-it notes on boards rather than keeping them. 
This assignment procedure resulted in 61 participants in the exaggerate-more condition 
and 66 participants in the exaggerate-less condition. 
 
RESULTS 
Suspicion checks 
One participant who suspected the use of cameras was excluded from analysis; 
however, including that participant did not change the results.  
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Mean-level accuracy  
For the mean-level analyses, I used a simultaneously fit hierarchical mixed model 
with a 2 (self versus other) within-subjects factor and a 2 (exaggerate-more versus 
exaggerate-less) between-subjects factor.  
 
Estimates  
There was a main effect of self versus other on estimates (F(1, 124) = 23.61, p < 
.0001); consistent with prior research, participants gave higher donation numbers for 
themselves (M = $3.65) versus others (M = $2.81). There was no main effect of 
exaggerate-more versus exaggerate-less (F(1, 124) = 1.02, p > .31). There was a 
significant interaction effect between self/other and exaggerate-more/exaggerate-less 
(F(1, 124) = 4.48, p < .04): the amounts that participants said they would donate were 
greater when they were required to make public how much they would donate to other 
participants (M = $4.02) than when they were not (M = $3.32; F(1, 124) = 3.64, p < 
.058); however, their estimates about other people’s donations did not differ regardless of 
whether participants could see others’ donation amounts on post-it notes (M exaggerate-more = 
$2.78, M exaggerate-less = $2.83; F(1, 124) = .02, p > .89). Actual donations did not differ 
between the exaggerate-more and exaggerate-less conditions (M exaggerate-more = $3.87, M 
exaggerate-less = $3.24; F(1, 124) = 1.95, p > .16). In sum, manipulation of social pressure 
that was meant to make participants exaggerate their intentions only increased self-
estimates, but did not increase other-estimates or actual donations. 
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Deviations from Actual 
Overall, the mean difference between self-estimates and actual donations (M = 
$0.11) was marginally significantly smaller than the mean difference between other-
estimates and actual donations (M = $0.73, F(1, 124) = 2.82, p < .096). Hence, average 
self-estimates were closer to actual donations than average other-estimates, although only 
to a marginally significant degree.  
 
 
 Exaggerate-more Exaggerate-less 
Means Correlations Means Correlations  
Self-estimates 4.02 .46 3.32 .66 
Other-estimates 2.78 .31 2.83 .45 
Actual behavior  3.87  3.24  
 
Table 3:  Study 2 – Mean Estimates/Actual Donations and Correlations of Estimates 
with Actual Donations 
  
Slopes 
I ran a hierarchical mixed model with estimates as the dependent variable and 
actual, self/other, and exaggerate-more/exaggerate-less as predictors. The two-way 
interaction between self/other and exaggerate-more/exaggerate-less was marginally 
significant (F(1, 122) = 3.16, p < .08), indicating that self-estimates in the exaggerate-
more condition were greater than in the exaggerate-less condition (F(1, 122) = 3.64, p < 
.06), whereas other-estimates were not different in the two conditions (F(1, 122) = .07, p 
> .78), essentially the same as results obtained from mean-level data. Hence, the self-
estimate line in the exaggerate-more condition was overall higher than the self-estimate 
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line in the exaggerate-less condition. The two-way interaction between self/other 
estimates and actual donations was significant (F(1, 122) = 10.54, p < .002), indicating 
that the slope of the self-estimate line (β = .50) was significantly greater than the slope of 
the other-estimate line (β = .28) as in Study 1. The three-way interaction between 
self/other, actual, and exaggerate-more/exaggerate-less was not significant (F(1, 122) = 
.40, p > .53) indicating that none of the slopes of self- or other-estimate lines were 
significantly different between the exaggerate-more and exaggerate-less conditions. 
Taken together, the results indicate that manipulation of social pressure led people to 
exaggerate more so the self-line in the exaggerate-more condition was higher than in the 
exaggerate-less condition, but this did not make the other-estimate line steeper. In other 
words, the manipulation did not result in improving the accuracy of other-estimates over 
self-estimates.  
 
 
Figure 3:  Study 2 – Self- and Other- Estimate Lines 
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I ran a hierarchical mixed model with deviations from actual donations as the 
dependent variable and actual, self/other, and exaggerate-more/exaggerate-less as 
predictors. There was also a significant two-way interaction between self/other and actual 
(F(1, 122) = 10.54, p < .002), which means that the relative accuracy of self- versus 
other- deviations depended on the level of actual donations. The interaction between 
self/other estimates and actual donations was significant (F(1, 40) = 6.57, p < .01), but 
the three-way interaction between actual, self/other, and exaggerate-more/exaggerate-less 
was not significant (F(1, 122) = .40, p > .53) indicating that the slope of the self-estimate 
line is substantially more similar to the slope of the perfect prediction line than to the 
slope of the other-estimate line, regardless of whether it was in the exaggerate-more 
condition or in the exaggerate-less condition. Spotlighting a donation level of zero 
showed that self-deviations (M = $1.91) were not different from other-deviations (M = 
$1.83; F(1, 122) = .06, p > .80). At a donation level of 6, self-deviations (M = $1.07) 
were smaller than other-deviations (M = $2.49; F(1, 122) = 35.42, p < .0001), which 
means self-estimates were significantly closer to actual donations than other-estimates. 
The floodlight analysis showed that the Johnson–Neyman point occurred at actual = 1.60 
(F(1, 122) = 3.90, p = .05), indicating that at actual donations < 1.60, deviations between 
self-estimates and actual donations were not significantly different from deviations 
between other-estimates and actual donations and above 1.60, they were significantly 
different. 
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DISCUSSION 
As expected, participants exaggerated their self-reporting about how much they 
would donate when other people could see their donation amounts. However, that 
exaggeration did not lead to indirect questions performing better than direct questions at 
predicting actual donations. Of course, theoretically, it is possible that people would 
exaggerate self-estimates to a greater extent if they were placed under even greater social 
pressure than in Study 2, in which case their self-estimates might differ more from their 
actual donations than their other-estimates. To be able to prove the validity of the 
projective technique theory, other-estimates should not only be closer to actual donations 
at the mean-level but they should also be more highly correlated with actual donations. 
Therefore, even if greater social pressure resulted in other-estimates being closer to actual 
donations than self-estimates, this alone would still not constitute evidence that people 
project, but rather to show that, social pressure would also have to make the other-
estimate line steeper. 
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Study 3 
 
In Study 3, I manipulated the similarity of projection targets by using two 
different projection targets in indirect questions: One was a more similar target, an 
economics major, and the other was a less similar target, a student in social work. In a 
pre-test, it was confirmed that the two targets were different in the degree to which 
participants felt similarity with the target: people thought they were more similar to an 
economics major (M = 4.18) than to a student in social work (M = 3.17; F(1, 81) = 13.58, 
p < .001).). Prior research says that people project more onto a similar other than onto a 
dissimilar other (Ames, 2004; Jenkins, Macrae, & Mitchell, 2008). If prior research 
findings are true, we should see a steeper other-estimate line when the projection target is 
an economics major. However, since my theory suggests that people don’t project, I 
expected that there would be no difference in the slopes of the other-estimate lines 
between the two targets.  
The two targets were also different in perceptions people had about the targets’ 
generosity: people thought a student in social work would be more generous (M = 4.52) 
than an economics major (M = 3.26; F(1, 38) = 7.26, p < .01). Thus, I expected that the 
other-estimate line for a student in social work would be overall higher than that for an 
economics major.  
 
METHOD 
Participants and design 
Two hundred and ten undergraduate students (51.2% females, average age 21.03 
years) participated in Study 3 in exchange for extra course credit. Study 3 used a 2 (self 
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versus other) x 2 (economics versus social work) design. The question type variable was 
within-subjects, and the projection target’s major variable was between-subjects. 
 
Procedure  
As in other studies, participants first received instructions about a hypothetical 
study and answered direct and indirect questions about donations to the United Way. The 
direct question was “How much would you donate out of your $6.00? Please indicate the 
amount you would donate to the United Way.” The indirect question depended on the 
condition identifying the projection target’s major, and was “How much would [an 
economics major / a student in social work] at UT donate out of his/her $6.00? Please 
indicate the amount he or she would donate to the United Way.”  
Participants then completed unrelated filler tasks. After the filler tasks, 
participants were told that they would really participate in the study for which they had 
already indicated hypothetical donation amounts for themselves and a projection target. 
They received full instructions that included information about the location of an 
envelope containing six dollars and the location of a donation room. They then went to 
the donation room and made their donation decisions. They then answered the suspicion-
check question as in Studies 1 and 2.  
 
RESULTS 
Suspicion checks  
Six participants were excluded from further analysis because they were 
suspicious; however, including them did not change the results. Two students suspected 
the use of cameras. Three students suspected some markings on money and one 
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participant mentioned I could have written the serial numbers of each bill to track their 
donation amount. 
 
Mean-level accuracy  
For the mean-level analyses, I used a simultaneously fit hierarchical mixed model 
with a 2 (self versus other) within-subjects factor and a 2 (economics versus social work) 
between-subjects factor. 
 
Estimates  
There was a main effect of economics major versus social work student (F(1, 202) 
= 12.93, p < .001): participants estimated higher donation numbers for a student in social 
work (M = $3.85) than those for an economics major (M = $2.86). There was no main 
effect of self versus other on estimates (F(1, 202) = .01, p > .90): self-estimates (M = 
$3.35) were not different from other-estimates (M = $3.36). There was a significant 
interaction effect between self/other and economics/social work (F(1, 202) = 37.76, p < 
.0001): participants said that an economics major would donate less than they themselves 
would (Mself = $3.25, Mother = $2.48; F(1, 202) = 18.17, p < .0001), but indicated that a 
student in social work would donate more than they themselves would (Mself = $3.45, 
Mother = $4.25; F(1, 202) = 19.60, p < .0001). Actual donations were not different when 
the projection target was an economics major versus when it was a student in social work 
(F(1, 202) = .15, p > .69). In sum, the different projection targets changed only other-
estimates, but didn’t change self-estimates or actual donations.  
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Deviations from Actual  
Overall, the mean difference between self-estimates and actual donations (M = 
$0.26) was significantly smaller than the mean difference between other-estimates and 
actual donations (M = $0.92, F(1, 202) = 8.55, p < .005). Deviations for an economics 
major target (M = $0.78) were not significantly different from those for the social work 
student target (M = $0.40; F(1, 202) = 2.76, p > .09). 
 
 
 Economics Social work 
Means Correlations Means Correlations  
Self-estimates 3.25 .65 3.45 .65 
Other-estimates 2.48 .27 4.25 .47 
Actual behavior  3.65  3.57  
Table 4:  Study 3 – Mean Estimates/Actual Donations and Correlations of Estimates 
with Actual Donations 
 
Correlation accuracy 
Actual behavior was more highly correlated with self-estimates than with other-
estimates, both in the economics condition (rself = .65, rother = .27; t(99) = 5.53, p < .0001) 
and in the social-work condition (rself = .65, rother = .47; t(99) = 3.07, p < .003). 
 
Slopes  
I ran a hierarchical mixed model with estimates of donations as the dependent 
variable and actual, self/other, and economics/social work predictors. The two-way 
interaction between self/other and economics/social work was significant (F(1, 200) = 
41.21, p < .0001), indicating that other-estimates in the social work condition were 
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significantly greater than in the economics condition (F(1, 200) = 3.64, p < .06), whereas 
self-estimates were not different (F(1, 200) = 1.18, p > .27), so the other-estimate line in 
the social work condition was overall higher than the other-estimate line in the economics 
condition. The two-way interaction between actual and self/other was significant (F(1, 
200) = 45.85, p < .0001), indicating that the slope of the self-estimate line (β = .59) was 
significantly greater than the slope of other-estimate line (β = .28) as in Studies 1 and 2. 
The three-way interaction between self/other, actual, and economics/social work was not 
significant (F(1, 200) = 2.00, p > .15), indicating that none of the slopes of self- and 
other-estimate lines were significantly different between the economics and social work 
conditions. Taken together, the economics/social work factor only changed the overall 
height of other-estimate lines without changing their slopes. 
I ran a hierarchical mixed model with deviations from actual donations as the 
dependent variable and actual, self/other, and economics/social work predictors. The 
interaction between self/other estimates and actual donations was significant (F(1, 200) = 
45.85, p < .0001), but the three-way interaction between actual donations, self/other 
estimates, and economics/social work was not significant (F(1, 200) = 2.00, p > .15) 
indicating that the slope of the self-estimate line is significantly more similar to the slope 
of the perfect prediction line than to the slope of the other-estimate line regardless of 
whether it was in the economics condition or in the social work condition. At a donation 
level of zero, self-deviations (M = $1.20) were significantly smaller than other-deviations 
(M = $2.34; F(1, 200) = 32.08, p < .0001). At a donation level of six, self-deviations (M = 
$1.26) were also smaller than other-deviations (M = $1.97; F(1, 200) = 20.41, p < .0001). 
These results mean that self-estimates were significantly closer to actual donations than 
were other-estimates at both donation levels of zero and six. The floodlight analysis 
showed that the Johnson–Neyman point occurred at actual = 2.94 (F(1, 200) = 3.88, p = 
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.05) and at actual = 4.47 (F(1, 200) = 3.89, p = .05), indicating that self deviations were 
not significantly different from other deviations between 2.94 and 4.47, but at other 
donation levels, self-deviations were significantly closer to actual donations than other 
deviations.  
 
DISCUSSION 
In Study 3, I used two different targets: a student in social work and an economics 
major. The two targets were different with respect to two factors: similarity to the 
respondent and the extent to which respondents thought each of the two targets would be 
generous. According to prior research, one would expect people to project more onto a 
more similar target (i.e., an economics major) than onto a less similar target (i.e., a 
student in social work), so the other-estimate line for an economics major would be 
steeper than that for a social work student. However, in Study 3, the slopes of the other-
estimate lines for the two targets were indifferent to this similarity factor. The perceived 
difference in generosity changed the overall height of other-estimate lines: the other-
estimate line for social work was overall higher than that for economics. Prior research 
did not measure actual behavior, but only measured self- and other-estimates. These prior 
researchers found a greater correlation between participants’ self- and other- estimates 
when the others were similar to them than when the others were dissimilar to them. With 
only these correlational results but without actual behavioral data, they then concluded 
that people project more onto similar others than onto dissimilar others. However, in 
Study 3, where participants’ actual behavioral data was measured as well as their self- 
and other-estimates, I established that the conclusion of prior research is unfounded. 
Again, I found no evidence that people project.  
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Study 4 
 
One of the purposes of Study 4 was to address the ceiling effect. In Studies 1 
through 3, I saw that larger donors were less likely to exaggerate their donation amounts 
than smaller donors, even if there was greater social pressure to exaggerate (especially in 
Study 2). However, some people might challenge this finding by saying it was impossible 
for six dollar donors to exaggerate their donation amounts to say they would donate more 
than the six dollars they had: their self-estimates could not exceed the donation ceiling of 
six dollars. So even if they wanted to exaggerate, they could not do it. Those donating 
four or five dollars would have room to exaggerate by at least one or two dollars, but 
unfortunately, I was unable to accurately determine whether these donors did exaggerate 
or not because so few participants donated four or five dollars in either Study 2 (i.e., 10 
participants) or Study 3 (i.e., 7 participants) and so few donated two dollars in Study 1 
(i.e., 5 participants). Thus, to tackle this issue, I tried to reduce the number of participants 
who would donate the maximum amounts out of all possible donations by doing two 
things. First, I used a relatively less well-known local charity, the Texas Historical 
Foundation, whereas I used nationally well-known charities such as the Red Cross in 
Study 1 and the United Way in Studies 2 and 3. Second, I increased the maximum 
possible donation amount from $6 or $3 to $15 to make it less likely that participants 
would donate all the money that they received. I applied the experimental procedure in 
the “lie more” condition of Study 3 because I needed to test whether large donors (e.g., 
13 or 14 dollar donors) would exaggerate their donation amounts even under greater 
social pressure.  
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METHOD 
Participants and design  
One hundred and forty-six undergraduate students (52.7% females, average age 
20.4 years) participated in Study 4 in exchange for extra course credit. Study 4 used a 2 
(self versus other) within-subjects design.  
 
Procedure  
Participants received envelopes containing fifteen dollars, significantly more than 
in Study 3. They went to the separate empty room to make donation decisions. In the 
room, they saw envelopes with a red dot and envelopes with a blue dot. They were asked 
to put the amount that they wanted to donate in one of the envelopes with a red dot and 
put the amount that they wanted to keep in an envelope with a blue dot. They then took 
the envelopes, left the room, and moved to another place with a die, a red box, and a blue 
box. They rolled the die. If they rolled a 6 on the die, they were asked to put the red-dot 
envelope in the red donation box and keep the blue-dot envelope with them. The money 
in the blue-dot envelope was their money, which they could take with them. If they rolled 
a number other than 6, they were asked to return the entire fifteen dollars by putting both 
envelopes in the blue box. The instructions about this procedure had been given to 
participants before they went to the donation room, so when they made decisions about 
how to allocate the fifteen dollars into the two envelopes, they understood that only if 
they rolled a 6 on a die would the amount they put in the red-dot envelope to donate 
actually be donated to the Texas Historical Foundation and only then would they be able 
to keep the money they put in the blue-dot envelope. Even though those who got a 
number other than 6 on the die returned the money, I still was able to determine how 
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much they had decided to donate by checking the amounts in the red-dot envelopes in the 
blue box. They then were asked to go back to their seats and complete the remaining part 
of the study, which included answering the suspicion-check question. 
Before they received fifteen dollars, as in the exaggerate-more condition of Study 
3, participants had been first primed with the sentence, “People like people who they 
think are generous (even if it is not true)” and were asked to answer direct and indirect 
questions as if they were participating in a hypothetical study. They received the same 
instructions as they would later receive, so they understood that donation decisions would 
only actually be carried out if the die landed on 6. Hence, participants answered direct 
and indirect questions with this in mind. When they answered direct questions, they also 
wrote their donation amounts on post-it notes, put the notes on their boards, and covered 
the amounts with a sheet. Later, at the end of the sessions, participants lifted the “cover” 
sheet so that they could see each other’s amounts on the post-it notes. 
 
RESULTS 
Suspicion checks  
In Study 4, there were no participants who had reasonable suspicion about the 
experimental procedure, so no participants were excluded from analysis.  
 
Mean-level accuracy  
I used a simultaneously fit hierarchical mixed model with a 2 (self versus other) 
within-subjects design.  
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Estimates 
Participants gave higher donation numbers for themselves (M = $7.16) versus 
others (M = $5.98; F(1, 145) = 13.32, p < .001).  
 
Deviations from Actual  
Overall, the mean difference between self-estimates and actual donations (M = 
$0.00) was significantly smaller than the mean difference between other-estimates and 
actual donations (M = $1.18, F(1, 144) = 13.32, p < .001). This means that average self-
estimates were significantly closer to actual donations than average other-estimates.  
 
 Means Correlations with actual behavior 
Self-estimates 7.16 .80 
Other-estimates 5.98 .46 
Actual donations 7.16  
Table 5:  Study 4 – Mean Estimates/Actual Donations and Correlations of Estimates 
with Actual Donations 
 
Correlation accuracy  
Actual behavior was more highly correlated with self-estimates (r = .80) than with 
other-estimates (r = .46; t(81) = 5.80, p < .0001). 
  
Slopes  
I ran a hierarchical mixed model with estimates of donations as the dependent 
variable and actual donations and self/other as predictors. The two-way interaction 
between actual and self/other was significant (F(1, 144) = 56.72, p < .0001), indicating 
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that the slope of the self-estimate line (β = .77) was significantly greater than the slope of 
the other-estimate line (β = .39), as was the case in Studies 1 through 3.  
I ran a hierarchical mixed model with deviations from actual donations as the 
dependent variable and actual donations and self/other estimates as predictors. The 
interaction between self/other estimates and actual donations was significant (F(1, 144) = 
56.72, p < .0001), indicating that the slope of the self-estimate line is substantially more 
similar to the slope of the perfect prediction line than to the slope of the other-estimate 
line and that the relative accuracy of self- versus other- deviations depended on the level 
of actual donations. A spotlight at a donation level of zero showed self-deviations (M = 
$1.62) were significantly smaller than other-deviations (M = $3.20; F(1, 144) = 11.86, p 
< .001). At a donation level of six, self-deviations (M = $1.77) were also smaller than 
other-deviations (M = $5.98; F(1, 144) = 74.63, p < .0001). Hence, self-estimates were 
significantly closer to actual donations than other-estimates at both donation levels of 
zero and six. The floodlight analysis showed that the Johnson–Neyman point occurred at 
actual = 2.15 (F(1, 144) = 3.91, p = .05) and at actual = 6.80 (F(1, 144) = 3.88, p = .05), 
indicating that self deviations were not significantly different from other deviations 
between 2.15 and 6.80, but at other donation levels, self deviations were significantly 
closer to actual donations than other deviations.  
  
DISCUSSION 
One limitation in studies 1 through 3 is the ceiling effect. About 50% of 
participants in studies 1 through 3 donated the maximum amounts given to them (i.e., 
three dollars in Study 1 and six dollars in Studies 2 and 3). In Study 4, the maximum 
donation amount was increased from three or six dollars to fifteen dollars to reduce the 
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percentage of participants who would donate the maximum. In Study 4, the percentage of 
participants who ended up donating the maximum amount was reduced to about 25%, but 
the pattern in Studies 1 through 3 still held true in Study 4.  
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General Discussion 
 
It has become commonplace for marketing researchers and other social scientists 
to ask participants about donations and other ethical questions indirectly by asking them 
what they think others will do (Chiou et al., 2011; Kaye et al., 2011; Luchs et al., 2010; 
D. L. Miller & Thomas, 2005; Sinha & Mandel, 2008; Steenhaut & Van Kenhove, 2005; 
Wilcox et al., 2009). The suggestion to use indirect measures has been made based on the 
projection theory (Fisher, 1993), but research suggesting the superiority of indirect over 
direct questioning based on the projection theory has not demonstrated that other-
estimates are better predictors of actual behavior than self-estimates.  
The present research is the first to examine whether other-estimates are actually 
better at predicting donation behavior than self-estimates. In addition, instead of 
measuring and/or making arguments about indirect measures in terms of mean-level data, 
in these studies I also measure the arguably more important metric of 
discrimination/correlation. I am able to make these detailed comparisons because I 
measure both estimates and actual donations for each individual and plot these individual 
estimates against actual donations instead of averaging them. 
I explain why some research using mean-level data (Balcetis & Dunning, 2013; 
Epley & Dunning, 2000) has shown that the mean other-estimate is closer to mean actual 
behavior, while other research (D. T. Miller & Ratner, 1998) reaches the opposite 
conclusion. I suggest that it cannot categorically be concluded that either the mean self- 
or mean other-estimate is closer to the mean actual donation, but rather mean-level 
predictions vary depending upon the distribution of donation amounts of participants.  
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My studies show that in terms of correlational accuracy, other-estimates are never 
better predictors of actual behavior than self-estimates. I found that direct questions 
eliciting self-estimates were better predictors of actual donations in the face of numerous 
other factors: single or multiple projection targets, less generous or more generous 
projection targets, less or greater social pressure, small or relatively large possible 
donation amounts, and donations to various types of charities. 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
Indirect questions have seemed like a good idea. Because they appeared to be 
useful and the projection theory that underlay their use was convincingly relied upon 
(Fisher, 1993), little research has been done on whether they actually yield the best 
approximation of donation behavior. Interestingly, the classical projection theory itself 
that indirect questioning proponents relied upon has been the subject of some controversy 
(Campbell, 1950; Holmes, 1968) but this controversy has not received significant 
attention. My research shows that skepticism about the theory may be warranted. 
Thus, the most obvious contribution of my research is to issue a warning about 
the pervasive use of indirect questions for questions about prosocial/ethical behavior such 
as donation propensity. There appears to be no reason to expect indirect measures to be 
especially accurate.  
Earlier in the paper I outlined the state of the literature before my research in 
terms of accuracy when using mean-level versus correlational-level data. Proponents of 
indirect questioning offer different theories: the projection theory (e.g., Fisher, 1993) or 
the holier-than-thou explanation (e.g., Epley and Dunning 2000) based on Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979)’s theory on singular and distributional information use. The two research 
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streams have the same predictions for mean-level comparisons but make different 
predictions for correlations. The projection-based proponents predict that actual behavior 
will be more closely correlated with other-estimates than with self-estimates, whereas 
proponents of Kahneman and Tversky (1979)’s theory do not. I found self-estimates to be 
consistently more correlated with actual behavior than other-estimates, which is 
inconsistent with the expectation of projection-based proponents.  
My research also at least starts to shed light on the conundrum in past research of 
contradictory mean-level findings. When Epley and Dunning (2000) discussed the 
inconsistency between their findings and those of Miller and Ratner (1998), they 
proposed that the differences were due to “whether the predicted situation involves 
hedonic consequences that are immediate or remote.” More specifically, participants had 
to donate money at the very moment they were asked in Epley and Dunning (2000)’s 
studies, whereas participants in Miller and Ratner (1998)’s studies predicted how they 
would behave (e.g., donate blood or not) at some time in the future. My studies serve to 
test this proposed explanation because even though participants in all of my studies 
donated immediately as in Epley and Dunning (2000)’s studies, my results were closer to 
Miller and Ratner’s (1998). Thus, the inconsistency in research findings is probably not 
due to timing, although I do acknowledge timing would be a useful avenue for future 
research. Rather, the inconsistencies seem to be due to the interaction with donation 
levels and the distribution of responses in particular studies.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research could profitably test whether the patterns I found hold true for 
other sensitive issues, such as cheating behavior, sexual behavior, or environmentally-
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friendly behavior. In addition, since I have shown that indirect questions, despite their 
popularity, are of limited usefulness at least for donation behavior predictions, future 
research might concentrate on how to improve direct estimates. Indirect estimation was 
developed because of the distrust researchers had for direct measures; this distrust has a 
long history dating back to the attitude-behavior literature (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). My 
studies show that direct measures of donation behavior are respectable predictors of 
actual donation behavior, perhaps because the questions I asked were very specific. All of 
the variables that influence measurement quality (i.e., specificity, time lags, emotionality 
of the question) might influence the correlations between self-estimates and actual 
donations compared to the correlations between other-estimates and actual donations. 
Although I would not expect the accuracy of indirect measures to surpass the accuracy of 
direct measures even when examined with these variables, at this point their influence is 
an empirical question to be pursued.  
Finally, I would suggest that future researchers measure both mean- and 
correlation-level accuracy when evaluating measures of respondent behavior. I also 
would suggest looking at interactions with the level of actual behavior being measured, 
which has occurred too rarely in studies to date. It was striking how much more I learned 
about my measures once I examined both mean and correlational data on the one hand, 
and donation levels on the other. By looking at the relative placement of other- versus 
self-estimates across the range of behavior, it is possible to get a sense of what drives 
other-estimates, and to identify when they might be useful for research, although they 
would not appear to be useful as accurate projective reflections of self-beliefs. For 
example, people do not seem to believe that others are always less ethical than they 
themselves are, across the range of ethical behavior. Future research could further 
elucidate this pattern. 
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